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ABSTRACT 
We examine the relationship between internal governance and earnings management in 
Japanese listed firms. Post the recent accounting frauds in large companies such as Olympus 
Corp. and Toshiba Corp., Japanese internal governance systems have also been widely 
criticized. Different from the US and UK, Japan is known as bank-dominated corporate 
governance system. We predict that the bank-client relationship is expected to mitigate 
opportunistic earnings management by mitigating the degree of information asymmetry, which 
is a main cause of agency problems arising from debt contracts. Our results show that bank-
appointed audit board members mitigate managerial earnings management. Furthermore, 
neither outside directors nor audit committees (ACs) are helpful to decrease opportunistic 
managerial earnings management. Our findings imply that a lender monitoring system, through 
audit board members, could contribute by substituting the monitoring role of outside directors 
and ACs. 
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Corporate governance mechanisms contribute to the alignment of the interests of managers 
with the interests of shareholders by enhancing the reliability of financial information (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986). Audit quality is a central issue to protect well-functioned capital 
market. In the early 21st century, several corporate financial scandals, such as those involving 
Enron or World.com, undermined the confidence of the US capital markets (Chan, Farrell, and 
Lee 2008). After the recent accounting scandals of Olympus and Toshiba, internal corporate 
governance systems and audit quality in Japan have also been widely criticized by practitioners 
and the media (Financial Times 2007; Financial Times 2012a; Financial Times 2015; etc.).  
After these corporate scandals of the US, an international trend has prevailed for 
development and implementation of corporate governance mechanisms to address the 
opportunistic behaviors that have assumed investors’ credibility with respect to financial 
information. Japanese audit quality has been reformed to improve. In 2006, corporate 
governance reports are required to submit for listing firms at Tokyo Stock Exchange (Listing 
Standards of Tokyo Stock Exchange). In 2008, publicly listed firms have a duty of submitting 
the submission of “Internal Control Report” (Financial Instruments and Exchange Act Article 
24-4-4).  
Although the recent Japanese accounting scandals results in doubts about the audit 
quality of publicly listed firms, no studies have examined the association between audit quality 
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and internal control systems. We address the empirical questions whether or not Japanese 
internal control systems result in lower audit quality. We also extend banking literature by 
examining whether or not banking relationships are helpful to enhance the audit quality based 
on previous studies. In addition, we investigate whether bank-appointed audit board member 
maintain audit quality. Different from Anglo-American internal control systems, audit board 
members (or Kansayaku) have a strong authority, such as the validity of accounts, under 
Japanese corporate law (Aoki et al. 1994). 
Previous literatures imply that auditing role of credible accounting information is a way 
of mitigating agency problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and higher quality of financial 
reporting lead to reducing information asymmetry (Datar et al. 1991). In the US, board 
structures with higher independence of the audit committee (AC) are expected to monitor 
corporate accounting processes (Klein 2002b). Fairness of financial reporting depends on the 
effectiveness of internal control mechanisms (Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta 2009; Ghosh, 
Marra, and Moon 2010). The listing requirement of NYSE and NASDAQ, which have to 
appoint at least three outside directors in audit committee in US, are not necessarily linked to 
demand of outside directors by creditors or shareholders (Klein 2002a). We extend the 
principle of ‘One size does not fit all’ to examine the relation between the audit quality and 
board of directors (Klein 2002a, 2002b). 
The expected relations between the audit quality and internal control are not obvious in 
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Japan. Different corporate governance structures are likely to be optimal for different firms 
(e.g., Larcker, Richardoson, and Tuna 2007). Within countries with strong legal enforcement, 
the relationships of bank-dominated economies such as those of Japan and Germany differ 
from those with market-oriented economies such as the US and UK (Aoki 1990). In addition, 
most Japanese board members are comprised of inside directors who have been promoted from 
firm employees (Aoki 1990). This is especially true in Japan, which allows firms to adopt either 
an Anglo American-style model or a more traditional Japanese model, which makes it 
especially difficult to characterize and measure board quality in Japan. 
Commercial banks are expected to be delegated as monitors by appointing board 
members or audit board members for other creditors and shareholders in Japan (Aoki, Patrick, 
and Sheard 1994; Morck and Nakamura 1999). Especially, commercial banks delegate their 
employees as directors or auditors to the boards of clients’ firms. Thus, the bank-appointed 
directors or auditors are expected to be effective monitors in relationship-oriented systems 
(Aoki 1990). Therefore, we examine whether the relation between bank-appointed directors 
and board members and audit quality measured by discretionary accruals. 
Using Japanese listed firms which consisted of 11,437 firm–year observations during 
2006–2014, we analyze the role of bank-appointed board members related to accounting 
quality. As expected, we find that discretionary accruals are lower for firms with bank-
appointed board members. We further analyze the relation between board independence and 
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audit quality. Different from U.S. (Klein 2002b), outside directors are not associated with 
discretionary accruals. Our results are robust when we control for observable confounding 
factors of firm and corporate governance characteristics associated with audit quality or bank-
appointed auditors using of propensity-score matching (PSM) method. 
This study contributes to the literatures related to following two ways. First, the recent 
accounting frauds uncovered in large companies have revived the debate related to desirable 
monitoring mechanisms under bank-dominated systems, such as those of Japan (Financial 
Times 2006; Financial Times 2011). Our findings make an important contribution by providing 
empirical evidence related to the debate on desirable monitoring systems in Japan. Second, we 
contribute to the growing finance literature related to lenders’ monitoring. Bank-dominated 
systems, represented as main bank relationships, are regarded as “the epitome of relationship 
banking” (Patrick 1994). We extend the literature related to the monitoring of lenders, which 
has not examined the relationship between bank-appointed audit board members and earnings 
management in Japan. 
The remainder of our manuscript is organized as follows. The next section presents 
background on Japanese corporate governance. After that we discuss the empirical predictions. 
Next, the empirical strategies and data are explained, followed by a summary of the empirical 




JAPANESE DUAL AUDIT SYSTEMS AND AUDITING 
Internal Audit Systems 
We introduce two types of Japanese internal audit systems, as portrayed in Figure 1. 
Before establishment of the Commercial Code Revision on Boards (2003), firms had to adopt 
a dual system, which comprises a board of directors and audit board members (traditionally 
designated as statutory auditors), as shown in (1) of Figure 1. After the 2000s, Japanese 
corporate governance mechanisms have been reformed to adopt Anglo-Saxon mechanisms, 
inducing changes of board systems and traditional bank-dominated corporate governance 
features (Chizema and Shinozawa 2012). Further, the introduction of the US-style committee 
system has been permitted after the establishment of the Commercial Code Revision on Boards 
(2003). However, firms with a committee system are not widely observed in Japan, because 
adoption of the committee system is a voluntary choice of firms1. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------ 
As for the independence of internal control, appointment of outside directors is not 
mandated under audit board member systems that do not have audit committees2. In these types 
                                                   
1 Firms with the US-style committee system occupies only 2 percent of our samples. 
2 The principle of Corporate Governance in Japan recommends firms with at least one outside 
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of firms, most of the directorships are occupied by inside directors who were promoted from 
employees. Thus, these less independent boards of directors do not tend to monitor the 
activities of executives. On the other hand, audit board members are expected to monitor their 
executives to protect the interest of shareholders in Japan. In this system, the audit board 
separately monitors activities of executives in their firm from the board of directors. 
Furthermore, amendments of commercial laws were implemented in 1993, 2001, and 
2005 to strengthen the independence of audit board members3. Post the amendments of 2005, 
firms that adopted a dual system must appoint outside audit board members that comprise more 
than half of the audit board, which has at least three members4. Therefore, monitoring of the 
audit board is expected to comprise more effective managing and monitoring by accounting 
auditors than prior to the amendment.  
                                                   
director (Tokyo Stock Exchange 2009). However, firms with no outside directors are widely 
observed in our data. 
3 For example, firms are encouraged to increase the number of outside audit members. In 
addition, the terms of office and responsibility of audit members are extended by law. Before 
the amendments of 1993, appointment of outside audit members was not mandated (Sakawa 
and Watanabel 2013). 
4  Outside audit members have not formerly been a director, officer, or employee of the 




The Role of Audit Board Members 
Figure 2 depicts the monitoring roles of audit board member systems, who can monitor the 
financial reporting of firms. Large firms have to appoint external auditors, such as accounting 
auditors. The selection of accounting auditors must be approved by the audit board before 
shareholder meetings. Accounting auditors conduct a primary audit of the financial activities 
of their client firms, and submit the financial reports to both the board of directors and the audit 
board. Audit board members have the right to audit both the process and the results of reporting. 
They can express their opinions or concerns related to financial reporting at the shareholder 
meetings.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------ 
Audit board members are guaranteed their positions and rights under Japanese corporate 
governance systems. While both the board of directors and the audit board members are elected 
at the shareholder meeting, the terms of audit board members are four years, which is longer 
than those of directors. In addition, executives cannot decrease their terms. As for legal rights, 
audit board members can participate in board meetings and express their opinions to prevent 
illegal activities and inappropriate decisions that may harm firm values. Audit board members 
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have the right to investigate the operations and assets of their firms, and to ask directors and 
employees to report on the operation of their company.  
 
Audit Quality 
Audit quality also depends on the audit firm size (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam 1998; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999). Regarding the change of accounting 
audits, large Japanese audit firms were restructured after Kanebo’s earnings fraud was 
uncovered in 2005. The large audit firms, known as the Big 4, included Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Shin-Nihon Ernst & Young, KPMG Azsan LLC, and Chuo-Aoyama PWC. In 2006, 
PWC was restructured as Arata PWC, and Chuo-Aoyama was restructured as Misuzu, which 
became defunct in July 2007. Thereafter, during 2006–2007, the Big 5 audit firms were Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Shin-Nihon Ernst & Young, KPMG Azsan LLC, Arata PWC, and Chuo-
Aoyama. After the Japanese FSA suspended Chuo Aoyama for two months due to Kanebo’s 
earnings fraud, Chuo-Aoyama lost their reputation (Skinner and Srinivasan 2012). Since 2008, 
Japan’s large audit firms comprised the Big 4, excluding Chuo-Aoyama. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Research on Internal Control Systems 
The monitoring roles of the board of directors are useful to monitor managers’ activities 
10 
 
(Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). We summarize 
the role of internal control, such as board size and the independence of both the board and the 
audit committees. First, Jensen (1993) points out that board of director monitoring roles could 
become less effective as board size increases. This effect is attributable to problems of 
coordination and communication. Second, the board’s ability to function as an effective 
monitor depends on its managerial independence (Beasley 1996). Therefore, board 
independence and independent audit committees are expected in effective internal control 
mechanisms. Finally, regarding the role of ACs, independent audit committees enhance the 
quality of financial reporting in the US and several countries outside the US (Garcia-Meca and 
Sanchez-Ballesta 2009; Ghosh et al. 2010; Klein 2002a). 
 
Research on Audit Quality 
Audit quality is regarded as a means of reducing agency issues to mitigate information 
asymmetry. The role of internal control to improve financial reporting has been paid attention 
by academics and practitioners (Qi, Li, Zhou, and Sun 2017). As for empirical studies, mixed 
evidence exists about the relationship between board structure such as board size and board 
independence and earnings management (Chin, Firth, and Rui 2006; Xie, Davidson, and 
DaDalt 2003; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, and Kent 2005; Bradbury Mak, and Tan 2006). In 
addition, directors who are appointed by commercial banks can provide their private 
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information and participate in managerial decision making of clients’ firms, such as capital 
investment and accounting conservatism (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfestein 1990, 1991; 
Erkens, Subramanyam, and Zhang 2014). Therefore, we address whether or not banking 
relationship enhances audit quality, measured by managerial earnings manipulation, in Japan. 
 
Bank Monitoring System 
Under Japanese bank-dominated corporate governance, bank relationships—represented as 
bank-appointed audit board members are expected to help mitigate opportunistic earnings 
management in Japanese firms. First, bank relationships can be expected to provide effective 
monitoring by reducing degrees of information asymmetry. Lending activities help to reduce 
information asymmetry and to increase market liquidity because private information might be 
gathered from bank relationships (Sakawa, Ubukata, and Watanabel 2014). Second, 
commercial banks have an incentive to monitor their clients’ firms, and frequently appoint the 
directors or audit boards5. If commercial banks fail in this monitoring role, they have to bear 
economic loss because the clients might not meet their contracted obligations 6 . Bank 
                                                   
5 Sheard (1994) shows examples of commercial bank involvement in the restructuring of client 
firms. Even in the 2010s, bank involvement is a typical means of supporting poor performing 
firms. Such practices have raised concern by shareholders, particularly foreign investors 
(Financial Times 2012b).  
6 In the case of Toshiba, the stock price of lenders that have a relationship with Toshiba 
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monitoring roles are represented as a function of client firms connected by bank relations (Aoki 
et al. 1994). Third, by appointing managers or employees as directors or audit board members 
of clients’ firms, commercial banks are better able to monitor or audit the activities and 
financial position of their clients, relative to what the banks can do through arms-length 
monitoring (Sheard 1994). In addition, Banks’ appointment of directors or audit board 
members serves as a disciplinary mechanism, by forcing executive turnover at firms when they 
face poor performance (Kang and Shivdasani 1995; Kaplan and Minton 1994). Furthermore, 
bank-appointed directors enhance executive incentives in Japanese firms (Colpan and 
Yoshikawa 2012). This discussion leads the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis: Firms with bank audit board members have less opportunistic earnings 
management than firms without bank audit board members. 
 
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data 
We selected data from non-financial firms with dual audit systems listed on the first section of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, after introducing the Japanese Company Act of 2005, which 
strengthens the independence and right of audit board members. Financial accounting data were 
collected from the Nikkei Needs Corporate database. Corporate governance data, including 
                                                   
declined after announcement of the accounting scandals (Financial Times 2016). 
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ownership structure and board composition, were obtained from the Nikkei Needs Corporate 
Governance evaluation system (CGES) database. The audit firms’ information was hand-
collected by Toyo Keizai (2006–2014). The big N audit firms consisted of the Big 4 or Big 5 
firms during our sample periods. Our selected sample consisted of 11,437 firm–year 
observations during 2006–20147. 
 
Proxy for Bank Monitoring Mechanisms 
We use bank monitoring proxy as the ratio of appointed audit board members to outside board 
members (Bank Audit Board). Bank audit board is the ratio of bank-appointed audit board 
members to outside directors. As for internal control systems, we included three variables such 
as audit board size, board size, and outside directors. Audit Board Size is the number of 
members on the audit board. Board Size represents the number of directors on the board. 
Outside Directors is the percentage of directors from outside the firm8. We eliminated firms 
                                                   
7 We selected our sample firms based on the following criteria: (i) Financial statements are 
available in the sample period. (ii) Observations include at least 15 firms in the same industry, 
as classified by the Nikkei Industry Classification Code. 
8 Following previous Japanese studies, we defined board independence as the proportion of 
outside directors who have never served as executive director, executive officer, or employee 
of the company or any of its subsidiaries, as reported in the companies’ annual report.  
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that use committees to analyze the role of the bank audit board, because firms with committees 
have no audit board. 
 
Measures of Financial Reporting Quality 
Following previous studies, this study uses discretionary accruals as our measure of accruals-
based earnings management. We estimate the following equation (1) using of cross-sectional 
models for each industry with at least 15 observations in a given year based on Nikkei Industry 
Classification Code Accrual𝑠𝑠it 𝐴𝐴it−1 = α𝐴𝐴it−1＋β1 ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅it𝐴𝐴it−1 + β2 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅it𝐴𝐴it−1 ＋εit                (1) 
where Accruals stands for total accruals, measured as the difference between net income 
(earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) and operating cash flows for 
firm i in year t, ΔREV signifies the change in net revenue for firm i in year t, and PPE represents 
property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t.  
The estimated residuals are defined as the discretionary accruals for firm i in the current 
year. Our measures of discretionary accruals are estimated by the Jones, the cross-sectional 
modified Jones, and the CFO-modified Jones model (Jones 1991; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 
1995; Kasznik 1999). We adopt the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ADA) as audit 





To investigate our empirical predictions, we examined the following OLS regression 
equation. 
ADA 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = β0＋β1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +＋β2𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ΣβjControl𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ε 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
where variables are defined in Appendix A. In this equation, ADA represents the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals, using the Jones and the modified Jones model. 
We adopted two sets of control variables. First, we used firm characteristics variables such 
as stock return volatility, firm size, growth opportunity, return on assets, financial leverage, 
and Topix 500 dummy9 (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; 
Matsumoto 2002). Second, we used governance variables such as Big N dummy, management 
shareholdings10, and stock options11.  
 
Empirical Strategy 
                                                   
9 The Topix 500 index consists of the top 500 listed firms on the Tokyo stock Exchange, and 
accounts for about 85 percent of the Exchange related to market capitalization. 
10 Management Shareholdings signifies the proportion of directors’ shareholdings, following 
Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000). 
11 Earnings management is more prevalent at firms whose executive compensation is closely 
tied to stock value via stock options (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cornett, Marcus, and 
Tehranian 2008).  
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We used propensity score matching (PSM) to control for the impact of confounding variables 
on the dependent variable. First, we estimated the conditional probability of the appointment 
of bank audit board to firms using a logit model. We matched firms with bank audit boards to 
at most four firms, without examining whether or not the bank audit board moderated earnings 
management. After adopting PSM, there was no significant difference between firms with bank 
audit boards and firms without in the resulting sample. By using PSM, we could create 
conditions that are similar to the randomized control group design in a quasi-randomized 
experiment. 
As for a logit model, bank board members were adopted as dependent variables and control 
variables. We used two types of control variables. First, we adopted ownership variables such 
as main bank shareholdings and foreign ownership. In addition, we also controlled firm 
characteristics such as cash to assets and bank lending12, the skewness of the daily returns, 




Descriptive Statistics and Logit Model 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics in Panel A, and the correlation matrix in Panel B. 
                                                   
12 Bank loans are a main source of financing for Japanese firms (Chan, Jiang, and Mo 2017). 
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We showed the mean difference between firms without Bank Audit Members and firms with 
Bank Audit Members in Table 2. The mean of the ADA of firms without Bank Audit Members 
is significantly higher than that of firms with such members. On the other hand, both Main 
Bank Shareholdings and Bank Debt of firms without Bank Audit Members are significantly 
lower than those of firms with such members.  
------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
------------------------ 
Table 3 shows the results of logit models to derive the score of PSM after controlling for 
confounding factors. In Table 3, the dependent variable is the Bank Audit Board dummy. We 
differently adopted four models to confirm the robustness. This table indicates that Main Bank 
Shareholdings, Foreign Ownership, and Cash to Assets are significant and positive in Models 
(1)–(4). We can find that Bank debt is significantly positive in Models (2) and (4).  
------------------------ 




We investigated our empirical predictions related to Japanese internal control mechanisms and 
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earnings management by estimating the OLS results of equation (2). We report the OLS results, 
including those for Bank Audit Board, in Table 413. First, we found that Bank Audit Board is 
significant and negatively associated with earnings management. This result implies that bank–
client relations function effectively through appointment of audit board members. Board Size 
is negatively associated with earnings management. Both Outside Directors and Audit Board 
Size are not significant.  
The results of control variables show that Management shareholdings are significant and 
positive, which implies that agency conflicts can be expected to occur in firms with higher 
managerial ownership. Volatility is significant and positive. Market to Book is positively 
associated with earnings management, suggesting that earnings management is greater for 
firms with high growth opportunities, consistent with Matsumoto (2002). Stock Option is 
positively associated with earnings management, consistent with Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006), and Cornett, Marcus, and Theranian (2008). Finally, TOPIX 500 is negatively 
associated with earnings management. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here  
------------------------ 
                                                   
13 For consideration of the multicollinearity of Bank Directors and Bank Audit Members, we 




Propensity Score Matching 
Next, we discuss additional analyses to solve issues arising from unobservable 
confounding factors. Using these four models, we investigated the effect of bank board 
members on earnings managements in Table 5. In each of the four models, we adopted three 
ADA estimated by the Jones model, the modified Jones model, and the CFO Jones model. We 
found that the coefficient of Bank Audit Board is negatively associated with earnings 
management for Models (1)–(4), which is consistent with the results of OLS in Table 4. In 
addition, the coefficient of Outside Directors is not significant. These results suggest that Bank 
Audit Board substitutes for monitoring mechanisms such as independent directors under 
Japanese bank-dominated corporate governance. 
------------------------ 




In this section, we confirm three types of robustness of our findings. First, we investigate the 
possible endogenous relations between monitoring activity and earnings management. To 
explore endogenous relations between internal control and earnings management, we used two-
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stage least-squares regression. We adopted instrument variables as lagged variables of 
instrumented variables, foreign shareholdings, and a dummy variable of American depositary 
receipts (ADR)14. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 and Table 7 about here  
------------------------ 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the results of two-stage least-squares regression. The estimated 
results of the first stage are summarized in Table 6. Using Table 7, the coefficient of Bank 
Audit Board is negatively associated with earnings management for all three models. Board 
Size is significant and negative in Model (3), after considering endogeneity. Outside Directors 
is significant and positive in Model (1), which implies that they represent ineffective monitors 
for preventing opportunistic earnings management. The results of financial variables are almost 
identical to the OLS results. 
Furthermore, we examined the relationship between the internal governance system and 
earnings management in Japan. As we mentioned, literatures point out the effective monitoring 
of both Outside Directors and Audit Committee. Therefore, we adopted all firms, including 
                                                   
14 ADRs are equal to 1 if a firm has American depositary receipt (ADR) programs, otherwise 
they are 0. Kang and Stultz (1997) find that firms with ADR programs have greater foreign 
ownership. Therefore, we adopt the ADR dummy as an instrument variable. 
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firms with ACs and firms without. From Table 8, we can observe that Board Size is significant 
and negatively related with earnings management. Both Outside Directors and Committee are 
not significantly correlated with earnings management.  
------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------ 
Finally, we confirmed robustness, using an alternative definition of board independence 
in untabulated results. We adopted a strict definition of board independence, following 
previous studies such as Klein (2002a)15. Using the strictly defined board independence, we 
also did not find the results of either board independence or Committees as significant. 
Therefore, we can confirm the robustness of our results by untabulated estimations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Using 11,437 firm–year observations from 2006 to 2014, we examined the monitoring role of 
bank–client relations. Japanese audit quality has been discussed frequently, since several cases 
                                                   
15 Previous studies such as Klein (2002a) define board independence by several criterions. 
Following the strict definition of the guidelines of TSE, we defined four categories of outside 
directors who might not be truly “independent directors:” (1) directors related to the parent 
company, (2) directors related to other affiliated companies, (3) directors who come from 
commercial banks, and (4) directors who are mutually dispatched. 
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of corporate fraud surfaced recently. We extend the perspectives of a bank-dominated system, 
which are expected to include bank-appointed audit board members (Aoki 1990; Aoki et al., 
1994). In addition, the principle of corporate governance in Japan recommends outside 
directors as effective monitors. Therefore, we investigated whether outside directors mitigate 
managerial opportunistic earnings management or not.  
We provide empirical evidence related to the association between earnings management 
and internal control. We find that bank monitoring mechanisms function through bank-
appointed audit board members. This result implies that bank-appointed audit board members 
mitigate earnings management by mitigating the degree of information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers.  
We also find that outside directors are not helpful to decrease opportunistic managerial 
earnings management. Board independence does not affect managerial opportunistic earnings 
management under Japanese bank-dominated systems. Under Japan’s unique internal control 
system, we revealed the monitoring roles of bank relationships, such as bank-appointed audit 
board members.  
We focus on Japanese firms to address the serious concerns related to accounting scandals. 
Our study provides an invaluable insight for both investors and regulators to ascertain the 
effectiveness of bank–client relations as effective gatekeepers in Japan. Furthermore, we 
contribute relationship banking literatures by analyzing the relationship between the features 
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Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables  
Jones ADA using the Jones model (%) 
Modified Jones ADA using a modified Jones model (%) 
Modified CFO Jones ADA using a modified Jones model with cash flow (%) 
Board Variables 
Bank Audit Board 
Number of outside audit board members who come from 
commercial banks 
Audit Board Size Number of audit board members 
Board Size Number of directors on the board 
Outside Directors Outside directors/ Board Size (%) 
Other Variables  
Volatility Stock price volatility during three years 
ln (MV) The logarithm of market value is adopted as firm size 
Market to Book Growth opportunity; Market Value/ Book Value of Capital 
ROA Return on Assets 
Leverage Debt/Total Assets 
Topix 500 
Topix 500 is equal to 1 if a firm includes the Topix 500 index; 
otherwise it is 0. 
Big N Big N audit firms consist of Big 4 or Big 5 audit firms 
Management 
Shareholdings 
Percentage of shareholding by board of directors that is followed 
by Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) 
Stock Option 
Stock-based incentives means the adoption of executive stock 
options (Sakawa, Moriyama, and Watanabel 2012). Stock Option 
is equal to 1 if a firm adopts stock options; otherwise it is 0. 
Main Bank 
Shareholdings 
Percentage of main bank shareholdings that is followed by Morck 
et al. (2000) 
Foreign Ownership Percentage of foreign shareholdings 
Cash to Assets The ratio of cash and security to assets 
Bank Debt Ratio 
The ratio of Bank debt to Market Value that is followed by 
O’Brien, David, Yoshikawa, and Delios (2014) 
Skewness The skewness of the daily returns 
Beta  The slope of the coefficient form regressing daily returns 
Min_Return  The minimum of the daily returns 












Corporate Ownership Percentage of corporate shareholdings 
ADR 
ADR is equal to 1 if a firm has American depositary receipt (ADR) 
programs; otherwise it is 0. 
Bank Directors 





Two Types of Japanese Monitoring Systems 
(1) Dual audit system (Board Directors and Audit board members) in Japan 
(Internal Audit) 
 
    Board of Directors 
 
 




      Accounting 
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(2) Committee system 
(Internal Audit) 
 
   Board of Directors 
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Monitoring of the Dual Audit System 
 
 
 General Meeting of Shareholders  
(Internal Audit) 
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 Executives   
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(External Audit) 
 
                  Accounting 

























Descriptive Statics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
 








Number Mean Median S.D. 5% 95%
Dependent Variables
Jones 11437 3.313 2.256 4.123 0.191 9.493
Modified Jones 11437 3.301 2.247 4.164 0.196 9.491
Modified CFO Jones 11437 2.629 1.810 3.317 0.174 7.582
Board Variables
Bank Audit Board 11437 0.254 0.000 0.512 0.000 1.000
Audit Board Size 11437 3.905 4.000 0.692 3.000 5.000
Board Size 11437 9.037 8.000 3.544 5.000 16.000
Outside Directors 11437 9.766 0.000 12.439 0.000 33.333
Other Variables
Volatility 11437 2.408 2.296 0.809 1.333 3.852
ln (MV) 11437 10.778 10.564 1.522 8.654 13.637
Market to Book 11437 1.331 0.998 1.637 0.436 3.147
ROA 11437 6.108 4.919 6.340 -0.985 16.299
Leverage 11437 48.739 49.100 19.667 16.380 80.340
Topix 500 11437 0.281 0.000 0.450 0.000 1.000
Big N 11437 0.815 1.000 0.388 0.000 1.000
Management Shareholdings 11437 4.354 0.598 8.497 0.035 23.851
Stock Option 11437 0.311 0.000 0.463 0.000 1.000
Matching Variables
Main Bank Shareholdings 11437 1.068 0.000 1.701 0.000 4.710
Foreign Ownership 11437 13.557 10.390 11.800 0.870 36.450
Cash to Assets 11437 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.008
Bank Debt Ratio 11437 0.393 0.106 0.766 0.000 1.674
Skewness 11433 0.271 0.183 1.014 -1.092 1.942
Beta 11433 1.057 1.039 0.395 0.444 1.725
Min_Return 11433 -9.058 -7.968 4.477 -17.647 -3.811
Std_Return 11433 1.863 1.708 0.827 0.905 3.360
37 
 
Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
 

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Jones
2. Modified Jones 0.96 *
3. Modified CFO Jones 0.75 * 0.77 *
4. Board Size -0.04 * -0.05 * -0.04 *
5. Committee -0.10 * -0.10 * -0.09 * 0.14 *
6. Outside Directors -0.11 * -0.11 * -0.11 * 0.10 * 0.39 *
7. Bank Directors 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 * 0.07 * -0.05 *
8. Volatility 0.20 * 0.20 * 0.21 * 0.01 -0.11 * -0.17 * -0.02
9. ln (MV) -0.12 * -0.12 * -0.11 * 0.13 * 0.46 * 0.44 * 0.15 * -0.20 *
10. Market to Book 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.08 * -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.08 * 0.11 * 0.21 *
11. ROA 0.01 0.00 -0.05 * -0.08 * -0.08 * -0.03 * 0.05 * -0.10 * 0.24 * 0.37 *
12. Leverage 0.05 * 0.05 * 0.05 * 0.13 * 0.14 * 0.12 * 0.01 0.24 * -0.05 * 0.07 * -0.33 *
13. Topix 500 -0.11 * -0.11 * -0.10 * 0.12 * 0.40 * 0.35 * 0.15 * -0.13 * 0.77 * 0.14 * 0.13 * -0.01
14. Big N -0.02 -0.02 * -0.02 0.04 * 0.06 * 0.04 * 0.09 * -0.08 * 0.16 * 0.04 * 0.09 * -0.01 0.13 *
15. Management 0.12 * 0.12 * 0.11 * -0.11 * -0.28 * -0.20 * -0.05 * 0.04 * -0.20 * 0.13 * 0.25 * -0.14 * -0.20 * 0.01
      Shareholdings




Mean Difference  
 
***, **, *, and † indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 2 shows the mean difference between firms without Bank Audit Board Members and 
firms with Bank Audit Board Members. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Variables are 







Jones 3.399 3.007 0.392 *** (4.21)
Modified Jones 3.398 2.958 0.440 *** (4.68)
Modified CFO Jones 2.705 2.358 0.346 *** (4.63)
Board Variables
Audit Board Size 3.853 4.089 -0.236 *** (-15.24)
Board Size 8.859 9.673 -0.814 *** (-10.21)
Outside Directors 9.532 10.600 -1.067 *** (-3.80)
Other Variables
Volatility 2.401 2.433 -0.032 (-1.73)
ln (MV) 10.678 11.133 -0.455 *** (-13.32)
Market to Book 1.345 1.283 0.061 (1.66)
ROA 6.364 5.196 1.168 *** (8.18)
Leverage 47.440 53.360 -5.920 *** (-13.43)
Topix 500 0.253 0.382 -0.129 *** (-12.76)
Big N 0.808 0.843 -0.035 *** (-4.00)
Management Shareholdings 4.843 2.615 2.227 *** (11.67)
Stock Option 0.324 0.265 0.059 *** (5.61)
Matching Variables
Main Bank Shareholdings 0.998 1.317 -0.319 *** (-8.34)
Foreign Ownership 13.254 14.635 -1.381 *** (-5.19)
Cash to Assets 0.002 0.003 -0.001 *** (-7.31)
Bank Debt Ratio 0.363 0.502 -0.139 *** (-8.04)
Skewness 0.278 0.244 0.034 (1.50)
Beta 1.041 1.115 -0.075 *** (-8.38)
Min_Return -9.026 -9.171 0.145 (1.44)
Std_Return 1.869 1.843 0.025 (1.35)






Estimated Results Related to Logit Models 
 
***, **, *, and † indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Industry dummies are 1-digit industry classifications. AUC means the area under the ROC 
(Receiver Operating Characteristics) curve. We cluster standard errors at the firm level. Z-








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Bank Shareholdings 0.119 *** 0.099 *** 0.111 *** 0.092 ***
(8.77) (7.10) (8.12) (6.57)
Foreign Ownership 0.008 *** 0.011 *** 0.007 *** 0.010 ***
(3.85) (4.91) (3.43) (4.53)
Cash to Assets 16.860 *** 16.280 *** 15.040 *** 13.910 ***
(5.43) (5.30) (4.86) (4.55)




Beta 0.473 *** 0.411 ***
(6.30) (5.41)
Min_Return -0.018 + -0.018 +  
(-1.71) (-1.76)
Std_Return -0.303 *** -0.360 ***
(-5.01) (-5.82)
Constant -1.816 *** -1.885 *** -1.872 *** -1.801 ***
(-15.20) (-15.67) (-13.71) (-13.16)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 11437 11437 11433 11433
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.031
Log Likelihood -5894.3 -5866.8 -5863.6 -5834.0
LR chi square 248.3 *** 303.4 *** 307.8 *** 367.0 ***




TABL 4  
Estimated Results Related to Audit Board Member (OLS) ADA𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = β0＋β1𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ＋β2𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + ΣβjControl𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ε 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
 
***, **, *, and † indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variables are ADA of Modified Jones in Models (1)–(3), ADA of Jones in Model 
(4), and ADA of Modified CFO Jones in Model (5). To control for residual dependence in our 
pooled time-series cross-sectional regression, we clustered standard errors at the firm and year 
level. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix A.
Bank Audit Board -0.237 *** -0.234 *** -0.204 ** -0.197 ***
(-3.86) (-3.79) (-3.11) (-3.86)
Audit Board Size -0.071 -0.062 -0.060 -0.037
(-1.24) (-1.07) (-1.00) (-0.79)
Board Size -0.042 *** -0.044 *** -0.042 *** -0.040 *** -0.041 ***
(-3.97) (-4.16) (-3.95) (-3.67) (-4.90)
Outside Directors 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 + 0.003
(1.39) (1.43) (1.45) (1.77) (1.14)
Volatility 0.942 *** 0.948 *** 0.945 *** 0.957 *** 0.795 ***
(8.88) (8.93) (8.89) (9.22) (8.83)
ln (MV) -0.059 -0.062 -0.051 -0.071 -0.011
(-1.13) (-1.20) (-0.98) (-1.40) (-0.26)
Market to Book 0.203 * 0.203 * 0.202 * 0.180 * 0.161 *  
(2.36) (2.36) (2.36) (2.37) (2.41)
ROA -0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.008 -0.047 ***
(-1.27) (-1.29) (-1.33) (-0.49) (-3.83)
Leverage 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000
(0.44) (0.55) (0.62) (1.43) (-0.23)
Topix 500 -0.505 *** -0.501 *** -0.498 *** -0.469 *** -0.302 ** 
(-3.89) (-3.87) (-3.84) (-3.75) (-2.92)
Big N 0.022 0.031 0.030 0.042 0.057
(0.20) (0.28) (0.28) (0.40) (0.72)
Management Shareholdings 0.039 *** 0.040 *** 0.039 *** 0.040 *** 0.034 ***
(5.72) (5.74) (5.66) (5.70) (6.92)
Stock Option 0.266 *** 0.254 ** 0.255 ** 0.287 *** 0.304 ***
(3.39) (3.23) (3.24) (3.49) (4.95)
Constant 2.029 ** 1.824 ** 1.934 ** 1.864 ** 1.284 *  
(3.22) (2.94) (3.04) (3.16) (2.46)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 11437 11437 11437 11437 11437
Adjusted R -squared 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.072 0.073
F  Test 25.27 *** 25.21 *** 24.32 *** 24.00 *** 23.67 ***
Modified Jones Jones Modified
CFO Jones




Estimated Results (Using Propensity-matched Sample) 
 
***, **, *, and † indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We matched firms with Bank Audit Board (n= 2510) to 
firms without (n= 8927), which is based on the propensity score of Models (1)–(4) in Table 7. We clustered standard errors at the firm level. T-
values are in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix A.
Bank Audit Board -0.244 ** -0.211 * -0.204 ** -0.224 ** -0.187 * -0.178 * -0.197 * -0.167 * -0.156 * -0.205 * -0.183 * -0.171 **
(-2.65) (-2.28) (-2.70) (-2.62) (-2.12) (-2.53) (-2.53) (-2.05) (-2.45) (-2.57) (-2.17) (-2.67)
Audit Board Size -0.037 -0.037 -0.017 -0.105 -0.105 -0.060 -0.102 -0.091 -0.099 -0.056 -0.063 -0.041
(-0.45) (-0.41) (-0.25) (-1.33) (-1.19) (-0.91) (-1.32) (-1.05) (-1.58) (-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.61)
Board Size -0.042 ** -0.037 * -0.030 * -0.036 * -0.031 + -0.030 * -0.030 * -0.029 + -0.034 ** -0.034 * -0.029 + -0.034 **
(-2.60) (-2.27) (-2.33) (-2.27) (-1.84) (-2.46) (-2.14) (-1.95) (-2.97) (-2.31) (-1.86) (-2.82)
Outside Directors -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.001
(-0.62) (-0.60) (-1.14) (0.75) (0.82) (0.28) (0.10) (0.22) (-0.03) (0.86) (0.97) (0.22)
Volatility 1.023 *** 1.078 *** 0.830 *** 1.004 *** 1.053 *** 0.838 *** 0.935 *** 1.016 *** 0.781 *** 0.962 *** 1.021 *** 0.779 ***
(5.88) (5.97) (5.78) (7.06) (6.80) (6.58) (8.55) (7.36) (8.39) (8.24) (7.21) (8.40)
ln (MV) -0.027 -0.070 -0.021 0.067 0.021 0.040 -0.008 -0.041 0.033 0.015 -0.024 0.018
(-0.36) (-0.94) (-0.35) (0.86) (0.27) (0.67) (-0.12) (-0.61) (0.62) (0.21) (-0.34) (0.32)
Market to Book 0.540 *** 0.443 ** 0.401 *** 0.152 * 0.127 + 0.136 * 0.259 * 0.215 * 0.218 * 0.222 + 0.189 + 0.188 *
(4.04) (3.21) (4.34) (1.96) (1.94) (1.99) (2.33) (2.16) (2.45) (1.93) (1.89) (2.05)
ROA -0.050 * -0.019 -0.076 *** -0.025 -0.001 -0.058 *** -0.028 -0.004 -0.061 *** -0.024 -0.001 -0.056 ***
(-2.03) (-0.60) (-3.86) (-1.37) (-0.02) (-3.56) (-1.58) (-0.15) (-3.92) (-1.35) (-0.03) (-3.94)
Leverage -0.004 0.000 -0.005 + 0.003 0.007 + 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.001
(-0.87) (0.01) (-1.69) (0.98) (1.81) (-0.10) (0.12) (1.16) (-0.75) (0.36) (1.37) (-0.48)
Topix 500 -0.596 ** -0.535 ** -0.380 * -0.748 *** -0.702 *** -0.437 ** -0.576 ** -0.538 ** -0.420 ** -0.623 *** -0.600 ** -0.396 **
(-2.97) (-2.80) (-2.29) (-3.57) (-3.48) (-2.70) (-3.18) (-3.03) (-2.87) (-3.34) (-3.26) (-2.67)
Big N 0.046 0.039 0.192 0.069 0.071 0.093 0.100 0.105 0.126 0.071 0.088 0.116
(0.28) (0.24) (1.55) (0.48) (0.50) (0.74) (0.77) (0.81) (1.12) (0.53) (0.66) (1.03)
Management 0.050 *** 0.049 ** 0.039 *** 0.041 *** 0.039 *** 0.037 *** 0.050 *** 0.049 *** 0.044 *** 0.040 *** 0.037 ** 0.035 ***
 Shareholdings (3.30) (3.25) (4.54) (3.96) (3.61) (4.62) (4.52) (4.28) (5.55) (3.61) (3.20) (4.25)
Stock Option 0.216 + 0.289 * 0.339 *** 0.257 * 0.339 * 0.365 *** 0.266 * 0.336 ** 0.319 *** 0.246 * 0.327 * 0.307 **
(1.91) (2.17) (3.60) (2.25) (2.52) (3.88) (2.49) (2.59) (3.52) (2.20) (2.41) (3.21)
Constant 1.557 + 1.505 + 1.242 0.675 0.678 0.742 1.500 * 1.284 + 1.010 + 1.049 0.958 0.960
(1.66) (1.66) (1.63) (0.72) (0.76) (0.99) (2.00) (1.73) (1.66) (1.31) (1.22) (1.54)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number 8060 8060 8060 8026 8026 8026 8138 8138 8138 8041 8041 8041
Adj R -squared 0.079 0.082 0.076 0.072 0.074 0.073 0.081 0.083 0.085 0.074 0.075 0.078
F  Test 9.01 *** 8.83 *** 9.34 *** 11.39 *** 11.14 *** 9.68 *** 12.27 *** 11.61 *** 11.38 *** 10.45 *** 10.15 *** 10.82 ***
Jones CFO Jones






Model (4)Model (3)Model (2)Model (1)
ModifiedModified Modified




Estimated Results Related to First Stage (add) 
 
***, **, *, and † indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variables are Board Size, Outside Directors, Audit Board Size, and Bank Audit 
Board. Our instrumental variables are lagged variables of the instrumented variables, Foreign 
Ownership, and American depositary receipt (ADR). We clustered standard errors at the firm 
level. T-values are in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag Board Size 0.861 *** -0.084 *** 0.005 *** 0.000
(105.97) (-4.51) (4.97) (-0.20)
Lag Outside Director 0.001 0.919 *** 0.000 0.000
(0.63) (149.74) (0.55) (0.60)
Lag Audit Board Size 0.012 0.129 0.855 *** 0.004
(0.43) (1.48) (109.42) (1.23)
Lag Bank Audit Board 0.024 0.028 -0.003 0.908 ***
(0.82) (0.30) (-0.45) (124.98)
Lag Foreign Ownership -0.005 ** 0.020 * -0.001 + -0.001
(-2.86) (2.45) (-1.92) (-1.64)
Lag Corporate Ownership 0.091 -0.041 0.018 -0.041 ** 
(1.00) (-0.11) (0.85) (-3.20)
Lag ADR -0.123 * 0.586 ** 0.005 -0.002
(-2.11) (2.92) (0.44) (-0.29)
Volatility -0.079 *** -0.088 -0.008 + -0.001
(-4.27) (-1.06) (-1.81) (-0.44)
ln (MV) 0.169 *** 0.073 0.032 *** 0.003
(8.64) (0.87) (7.09) (1.31)
Market to Book -0.012 + 0.066 -0.003 -0.002
(-1.80) (1.13) (-1.38) (-1.23)
ROA 0.005 + 0.005 0.000 0.001
(1.78) (0.39) (-0.39) (1.49)
Leverage 0.003 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 0.000
(3.74) (1.03) (3.54) (1.18)
Topix 500 -0.008 0.039 0.009 0.001
(-0.15) (0.21) (0.83) (0.16)
Big N -0.055 -0.055 0.003 0.006
(-1.54) (-0.41) (0.43) (1.18)
Management Shareholdings -0.001 -0.022 * -0.001 ** 0.000
(-0.57) (-2.56) (-3.20) (-1.05)
Stock Option -0.027 0.295 * 0.003 -0.006
(-0.87) (2.40) (0.37) (-1.33)
Constant -0.479 * 2.246 ** 0.153 *** -0.025
(-2.47) (2.75) (3.69) (-0.90)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 9784 9784 9784 9784
Adjusted R2 0.848 0.833 0.811 0.833
F 989.8 *** 1509.7 *** 1565.5 *** 824.4 ***




Estimated Results Related to Audit Board Members (2SLS) ADA𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = β0＋β1𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ＋β2𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + ΣβjControl𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ε 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
 
***, **, *, and † indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables are ADA of Jones in Model (1), ADA of Modified Jones in Model (2), 
and ADA of Modified CFO Jones in Model (3). The results of the first stage are shown in Table 
5. We adopted the Hansen J test for over identification test. Z-values are in parentheses. Under-
identification tests show the value of the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic. Both Anderson-Rubin 
Wald F and Anderson-Rubin Wald Chi2 mean the values of Weak-instrument-robust inference. 
We clustered standard errors at the firm level. T-values are in parentheses. Variables are defined 




Bank Audit Board -0.208 ** -0.223 ** -0.209 ***
(-2.63) (-2.93) (-3.38)
Audit Board Size -0.101 -0.121 -0.121
(-1.16) (-1.34) (-1.60)
Board Size -0.021 + -0.024 + -0.035 ***
(-1.67) (-1.95) (-3.61)
Outside Directors 0.009 * 0.009 + 0.007 +
(2.06) (1.88) (1.70)
Volatility 0.923 *** 0.912 *** 0.732 ***
(7.54) (7.30) (7.12)
ln (MV) -0.071 -0.039 -0.004
(-1.24) (-0.64) (-0.07)
Market to Book 0.171 * 0.196 * 0.169 *
(2.03) (2.00) (2.04)
ROA -0.014 -0.030 + -0.056 ***
(-0.78) (-1.80) (-4.11)
Leverage 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.58) (-0.19) (-0.56)
Topix 500 -0.491 *** -0.543 *** -0.307 **
(-3.65) (-3.83) (-2.65)
Big N 0.079 0.071 0.039
(0.75) (0.66) (0.47)
Management Shareholdings 0.044 *** 0.044 *** 0.037 ***
(5.50) (5.64) (6.30)
Stock Option 0.212 * 0.183 * 0.278 ***
(2.40) (2.16) (4.00)
Constant 1.967 *** 1.985 ** 1.623 **
(3.44) (3.23) (3.15)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 9784 9784 9784
Adjusted R -squared 0.064 0.063 0.067
F  Test 19.11 *** 19.97 *** 18.45 ***
Hansen J  Test 6.34 + 5.91 3.95
Underidentification test 2265.6 *** 2265.6 *** 2265.6 ***
Anderson-Rubin Wald F 4.742 *** 5.84 *** 8.858 ***
Anderson-Rubin Wald Chi2 33.27 *** 40.98 *** 62.16 ***
43 
 
TABLE 8  
Estimated Results (OLS) ADA𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = β0＋β1𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ＋β2𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + ΣβjControl𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ε 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
 
***, **, *, and † indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variables are ADA of Modified Jones in Models (1)–(4). To control for residual 
dependence in our pooled time-series cross-sectional regression, we clustered standard errors 
at the firm and year level. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
Board Size -0.044 *** -0.044 *** -0.046 *** -0.045 ***
(-4.19) (-4.20) (-4.46) (-4.21)
Outside Directors 0.004 0.005 0.005
(1.38) (1.45) (1.57)
Committee -0.134 0.040 -0.141
(-0.60) (0.20) (-0.63)
Bank Directors -0.004 -0.009
(-0.39) (-0.84)
Volatility 0.954 *** 0.954 *** 0.952 *** 0.953 ***
(9.14) (9.15) (9.11) (9.13)
ln (MV) -0.068 -0.067 -0.061 -0.065
(-1.38) (-1.35) (-1.25) (-1.32)
Market to Book 0.196 * 0.196 * 0.198 * 0.196 *
(2.45) (2.45) (2.46) (2.45)
ROA -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019
(-1.26) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-1.28)
Leverage 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.51) (0.51) (0.55) (0.52)
Topix 500 -0.511 *** -0.513 *** -0.508 *** -0.514 ***
(-3.98) (-4.01) (-3.94) (-4.01)
Big N 0.020 0.021 0.029 0.020
(0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.19)
Management Shareholdings 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.039 *** 0.040 ***
(5.83) (5.83) (5.78) (5.81)
Stock Option 0.282 *** 0.283 *** 0.301 *** 0.287 ***
(3.66) (3.67) (3.86) (3.71)
Constant 1.842 ** 1.818 ** 1.829 ** 1.808 **
(3.07) (3.02) (3.03) (3.01)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 11689 11689 11689 11689
Adjusted R -squared 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.070
F  Test 26.97 *** 25.62 *** 25.03 *** 24.45 ***
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Modified Jones
